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The ﬁascoes that seem to accompany the annual publication of examination results
in England, the subsequent inquiries instituted to ensure they ‘never happen again’
and the Secretary of State’s decision, reversed six months later because of fears
about possible EU legal challenges, to ‘end competition between exam boards’
raise some interesting issues about the way Examination Boards (or ‘Awarding
Bodies’) operate in what is partly a competitive and partly a cooperative market.
At the operational level, they need to make sufﬁcient proﬁt from the fees they
charge schools to operate the assessment and awards system effectively; at the stra-
tegic level, they need to police the proliferation of awards so that some reasonable
level of efﬁciency is obtained in the system. This paper models the education
awards market such that the implications of the various alternative strategies for
achieving the twin objectives of effectiveness and efﬁciency can be understood. It
describes how Awarding Bodies cooperate and compete to maximise proﬁt, and
justiﬁes the original decision in September 2012 by minister Gove to create a
monopoly in the awards and assessment market.
Keywords: theory; quantative
Introduction
On 17 September 2012, the Education Secretary announced that GCSEs were to
be replaced in core subjects by the English Baccalaureate with immediate effect
in order to ‘make the UK competitive’ and ‘make opportunity more equal for
every child’ (BBC 2012). A public consultation was initiated, until 10 December
2012, but the intention was clear from the outset: to increase rigour in a qualiﬁca-
tion and examination system that had ‘corrupted the fair testing of students’ and
‘condemned thousands of students to courses which explicitly placed a cap on
aspiration’ (Gove 2012). Key to this reform was the need to have instead:
… a single suite of qualiﬁcations provided by a single awarding body. (Conservative
Party 2012)
And, according to the minister:
Critically [to] end the competition between exam boards which has led to a race to
the bottom with different boards offering easier courses or assistance to teachers in a
corrupt effort to massage up pass rates. (Gove 2012)
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Gove’s view was supported by organisations such as the Wellcome Trust
who had long argued that a single Exam Board/Awarding Body would simplify
(and perhaps even make redundant) the current unwieldy regulatory system and
‘concentrate expertise and investment in a single institution, be more conducive
to sharing best practice, avoid the unnecessary replication of functions across
multiple boards, and allow for greater economies of scale’ (Croft and Spread
2012).
Not everyone agreed, of course. The right-of-centre ‘think–tank’, the Institute of
Economic Affairs (IEA), warned that despite:
the Secretary of State’s publicly stated concerns that competition between Awarding
Bodies [was] contributing to declining standards, … his proposal that the system
should be consolidated into a single exam board, as in Singapore or Finland [had] a
number of theoretical ﬂaws. (Croft and Spread 2012)
While acknowledging that Gove’s view was ‘appealing because it provided a tidy
bureaucratic solution to … a messy and proﬂigate problem’, IEA suggested that this
did ‘not justify a system overhaul’ and that fears about the adverse effect of
competition on standards were not well grounded because:
… they suggest a degree of insider knowledge on the part of examiners about
what will come up in a given exam, how criterion [sic] will be applied, and
where grade boundaries will fall, that they simply do not have. (Croft and Spread
2012)
The reality, IEA suggests, is that:
It is neither in the individual nor collective interest of exam boards to compete for
custom on the basis of the accessibility of passes, as to do so would undermine the
currency of their qualiﬁcations. (ibid.)
It is a less-than-convincing argument; perhaps, the reason it was made at all
stems from the extraordinary sight of a Conservative Secretary of State blaming
competition for dysfunction in the education system when it was such a major
ideological plank of right-wing policy for decades. In any case and for reasons
unrelated to competition, on 7 February 2013, six months after making his
original decision, minister Gove did a U-turn, having reportedly1 been warned
by civil servants that having just one Exam Board could breach EU rules on
public service contracts and be open to judicial review. However, there was no
indication that the minister considered his original proposal wrong per se, but
rather that it was:
… a bridge too far. My idea that we end the competition between exam boards …
was one reform too many at this time. The exam regulator Ofqual … was clear that
there were signiﬁcant risks in trying to both strengthen qualiﬁcations and end competi-
tion in … the exams market [and] I will not proceed with plans to have a single exam
board. (Gove 2013)
Although the subtleties of the original policy and its subsequent reversal have gone
unnoticed, they should at least prompt us to examine anew the theory of Awarding
































Much has been made over the last few decades of the education market, and educa-
tion journals and newspapers have increasingly carried papers with an economics
bent: market place regulation, the dynamics of competition, performance-related pay,
contracting academic labour and so on. The conceptualisation of schooling as a
market is one that forces a certain discourse and imposes a particular vocabulary –
terms like ‘consumer’, ‘customer’, ‘performance appraisal’, ‘competition’, ‘marketi-
sation’ and ‘retail power’ have crept almost unnoticed into our discourse on school
improvement – but it is not clear how far the underpinning conceptualisation can be
pursued or how consistent policy-makers intend to be when it comes to regulation.
For a market to exist, there must be competition – that was the legislative intent
of most education reforms since the 1988 Education Reform Act – but although
competition was intended to generate diversity and efﬁciency by empowering par-
ents (and schools) as consumers and localising management, suspicion lingered
among policy-makers that aspects of cooperation in the education marketplace
amount to collusion, and although certain cooperative arrangements (like academy
chains) have gained approval, it is still the view among the main political parties
that a successful market must be at least partly competitive.
There are many markets within education, one of which is the awards and
assessment market, where transactions are carried out between Awarding Bodies
(on behalf of the state) and schools (on behalf of the customer). There are eight2
Awarding Bodies in the UK, although three large unitary bodies dominate the mar-
ket; the Edexcel Foundation, the Assessment and Qualiﬁcations Alliance (AQA)
and the Oxford, Cambridge & RSA examinations body (OCR). The market is vast
– each year A-level qualiﬁcations alone generate some 24 million scripts – and in
addition, a wide range of awards exists outside traditional areas, including voca-
tional, occupational and training qualiﬁcations, and entry-level certiﬁcates. Schools
are charged between £70 and £80 (approx.) per pupil per subject award at A-level,
although it varies from subject to subject, and the entire system is overseen by the
Ofﬁce of Qualiﬁcations and Examinations Regulation (Ofqual).3 The three unitary
Awarding Bodies have similar histories and remits. OCR was formed in 1998 from
an amalgamation of the University of Cambridge Local Examination Syndicate and
the Royal Society of Arts. Its qualiﬁcations are taken at more than 13,000 centres
nationwide. AQA came into existence in April 2000 following the merger of the
Associated Examining Board and the Northern Examinations and Assessment Board
and is the largest of the three Awarding Bodies. Edexcel was formed in 1996 by
the merger of the Business and Technology Education Council (itself a merger in
1983 between the Technician Education Council and the Business Education
Council) and the University of London Examinations and Assessment Council
(established in 1991). It is part of the Pearson Group and grades some ﬁve million
exam scripts each year.
Those charged with overseeing this market have for a decade spoken of the
urgent need for reform. In Autumn 2002, Ken Boston, then head of the QCA,
the regulatory body at the time, giving evidence to the House of Commons Select
Committee, described the UK awards and assessment system as an excessive
cottage industry run by underpaid and inexperienced assessors (Boston 2002).
Others have described it as a Victorian system with inherent and long-term recruit-
ment problems (Kerr 2002; O’Kane 2002), though opinion has been more divided






























over the desirability and effect of greater choice. For example, the 2011 review of
vocational education carried out by Alison Wolf (2011), which set out to examine
why England fails to provide young people with a ‘proper technical and practical
education’ compared to other countries, found in relation to the Awarding Bodies
that in spite of attempts to rationalise the system in the 1980s, there were more
qualiﬁcations now than ever before, and the number was rising.4 The report recom-
mended that Awarding Bodies be given greater freedom to develop, and that
schools be given the freedom to choose their preferred qualiﬁcations, though it is
not clear how or why such proliferation would result ipso facto in ‘better’ educa-
tional outcomes. One can see why it might result in greater market efﬁciency
through competition, but not why it should result in a more effective market, which
was and remains the primary concern.
There has been very little research in the area of Award Body marketization –
most commentators have focused on the curriculum they deliver (e.g. Dhillon 2005)
and the process by which it is assessed and standardised (e.g. Black and Bramley
2008) – though an investigation by Malacova and Bell (2006) into whether schools
that had changed Awarding Body/Syllabus showed an improvement in GCSE exam-
ination results compared to those that had not changed. However, the Malacova and
Bell research was more about changes in demand than changes in supply, which is
where the main policy concerns are situated,5 at least as far as minister Gove is
concerned, so that ﬁnding out that schools that change syllabus do not necessarily
move to an ‘easier’ one6 is not addressing the most pressing issue.
Oligopolies and interdependency
Oligopoly is a term used to describe a situation where a number of organisations
dominate a particular market and where, as result of interdependency, the behaviour
of one organisation affects the proﬁt made by the others. Oligopoly comes some-
where between the extremes of monopoly and pure market, but is distinguished from
both by this condition of interdependency. In a pure market, the fee for a service or
the price of a commodity is set solely by competition and organisations are, therefore,
independent. In a monopoly, by deﬁnition, there is no interdependency.
It is difﬁcult to predict responses to competition in education; the heterogeneity
of schools and their catchments usually prevents it. However, the awards and
assessment market is homogeneous and non-localised, and the beneﬁts of competi-
tion and cooperation are relatively easy to predict if the market is modelled as a
simple three-way oligopoly dominated by the three unitary Awarding Bodies and
based on the following assumptions:
• That Awarding Bodies select courses of action as if they are acting simulta-
neously and pay-off structures are common knowledge to all, like a ‘sealed-
bid’ auction. Each Awarding Body supplies the market without observing the
output from competitors. The market is a static game of complete information,
rather than a dynamic one where Awarding Bodies observe the actions of
competitors before deciding on their own courses of action.
• That greater fee income results in more and better examiners being employed
to operate the assessment and awards system, so that proﬁt and effectiveness
are somehow directly related.
• That there is no cartel-type fee ﬁxing and each Awarding Body can in theory































• That the fee per award charged to schools is a function of output; the greater
the range of awards the lower the fee that can be charged.
• That Awarding Bodies compete with each other either in terms of the range
of their awards (output) or in terms of the fees they charge schools (income).
These scenarios will now be considered in turn.
Model 1. The awards market modelled as an three-way oligopoly where the
strategic variable is output
This model describes how the three Awarding Bodies, selling more or less the same
examination products, can settle on the range of their respective outputs so as to
maximise proﬁt and effectiveness.
OCR, AQA and Edexcel dominate the market to differing degrees. Say OCR
supplies R1 awards every year, AQA supplies R2 and Edexcel supplies R3. If the
fee per award charged to schools (P) is a function of output (R), and the greater the
total output of awards the lower the fee, then the relationship between fee and
output can be represented linearly and negatively as:
P ¼ kðA RÞ
where k and A are some ﬁxed constants, and R=R1 +R2 +R3.
OCR, AQA and Edexcel are not strictly in competition with each other, but
partly competing and partly cooperating in the marketplace. The situation is essen-
tially a mixed-motive game with each Awarding Body seeking to maximise proﬁt
subject to what the market will take.
If c1 is the marginal cost of processing each award for OCR, c2 is the cost of
processing each award for AQA and c3 is the corresponding cost for Edexcel – all
constants in any given year, say – then the cost to OCR of outputting R1 awards is
c1R1, the corresponding cost to AQA is c2R2 and the corresponding cost to Edexcel
is c3R3. Therefore, the proﬁt (Ψ) functions are:
W1 ¼ kðA RÞR1  c1R1
W2 ¼ kðA RÞR2  c2R2
W3 ¼ kðA RÞR3  c3R3
where Ψ1 represents OCR’s proﬁt, Ψ2 represents AQA’s proﬁt and Ψ3 represents
that of Edexcel. Substituting for R gives:
W1 ¼ kAR1  kR21  kR1R2  kR1R3  c1R1
W2 ¼ kAR2  kR22  kR1R2  kR2R3  c2R1
W3 ¼ kAR3  kR23  kR1R3  kR2R3  c3R1
Since Awarding Bodies choose their strategies independently and simultaneously,
the concept of a Nash equilibrium offers a solution. Such an equilibrium can be
found by drawing each Awarding Body’s reaction function – the function that shows






























every optimal output level for every possible output level of the other Awarding
Bodies – and this in turn can be found by differentiating the proﬁt equations with
respect to output (A, k, c1, c2 and c3 are assumed to be non-negative constants):
dW1
dR1
¼ kA 2kR1  kR2  kR3  c1
dW2
dR2
¼ kA kR1  2kR2  kR3  c2
dW3
dR3
¼ kA kR1  kR2  2kR3  c3
If the ﬁrst derivatives are put equal to zero, then the three Awarding Bodies’ reac-
tion functions are:
2kR1 þ kR2 þ kR3 ¼ kA c1
kR1 þ 2kR2 þ kR3 ¼ kA c2
kR1 þ kR2 þ 2kR3 ¼ kA c3
The optimal levels of output for each can be seen to be negatively related to the
level of supply from the others, and since the second derivatives are negative
(=2k), local maxima are indicated.
Simultaneous equations produce the Nash equilibrium solutions:
RN1 ¼ kA 3c1 þ c2 þ c34k
RN2 ¼ kA c1 þ 3c2 þ c34k
RN3 ¼ kA c1 þ c2 þ 3c34k
Total output at the Nash equilibrium is:
RN ¼ RN1 þ RN2 þ RN3 ¼ 3kA c1  c2  c34k
and the maximum fee that can be sustained by the market is:
PðRÞ ¼ kðA RNÞ ¼ kAþ c1 þ c2 þ c34k
Figure 1 represents the model diagrammatically. It can be seen that levels of































supplies (kA ci)/2k awards to the market, the intercept value of each of the
reaction functions and the fact that total output in the triopolistic situation is
one-and-a-half times greater at 3(kA c)/4k is support for minister Gove’s original
(2012) decision to monopolise the awards market if funding the system is the
strategic priority, albeit with a better-deﬁned and more stringent watchdog role on
the part of Ofqual or its replacement.
This model is realistic insofar as each Awarding Body supplies the market
without simultaneously observing the output from the other Awarding Bodies
and there is no reason to suppose that the fees charged to schools are anything
other than a function of output, just as the model assumes.7
Model 2. The awards market modelled as an duopoly where the strategic
variable is output
Consider a reduction in the number of Awarding Bodies from three to two, such
that OCR and AQA (say) are the two remaining players in the sector. Using the
same notation and procedure as in the previous model and putting k = 1 for simplic-
ity, the reaction functions become:
2R1 þ R2 ¼ A c1
R1 þ 2R2 ¼ A c2
(kA + c1 - 3 c2 + c3 ) / 4k





Reaction function for AQA





Reaction function for Edexcel
Figure 1. The Nash equilibrium for the three Awarding Bodies competing in terms of
output.






























and they produce the Nash solutions illustrated on Figure 2.
RN1 ¼ Aþ c2  2c13
RN2 ¼ Aþ c1  2c23
Figure 3 shows a pair of iso-proﬁt curves, which plot the different combinations
of output levels that yield the same level of proﬁt for each awarding body in turn.
They are centred at the Nash equilibrium coordinates. The further away each is
from its axis – from its monopolistic situation – the lower the awarding body’s
proﬁt. Only at the Nash equilibrium (marked N on Figures 2–4) are both organisa-
tions maximising proﬁt simultaneously. The Nash equilibrium is, therefore, unique
and stable, but again if increased funding for the system is the overriding priority,
there is a case to be made for a monopoly.
A contract line, C, which represents all the points where outcomes are pareto-
efﬁcient, is also shown on Figure 3. It represents a constant-sum sub-game of the
model. If both Awarding Bodies could coordinate their output levels, they would
maximise levels of proﬁt by choosing strategic combinations on this line. And,
given that they should also choose strategies inside area T – the combinations for
which the iso-proﬁt curves are tangential constitute this area, bounded by the two
iso-proﬁt curves that intersect at the Nash equilibrium – the optimal combination
should be both on C and inside T. However, not being a Nash equilibrium and
being off the reaction function lines, this optimal point of C in T is inherently
unstable because each Awarding Body has an incentive to deviate from it. The
N
Reaction function for 
OCR 
Reaction function for 
AQA 
(A + c1 - 2c2 ) / 3 
A - c1
A – c2
(A - c2 ) / 2 
(A - c1 ) / 2 (A - 2c1 + c2) / 3 
Nash equilibrium (also the Cournot 
equilibrium; c.f. Figure 4) 
R2
R1































situation is analogous to games like the Prisoner’s Dilemma and explains why car-
tels, both legal and illegal, tend to be unstable; each party to the collusion has an






Reaction function for 
AQA 
(A + c1 - 2c2 ) / 3 
A - c1
A – c2
(A - c2 ) / 2 
(A - c1 ) / 2 (A - 2c1 + c2) / 3 
Nash equilibrium (also the Cournot 
equilibrium; c.f. Figure 4) 
R2
R1








(A - c2 ) / 2 
(A - c1 ) / 2 
Cournot (and Nash) equilibrium 
R 2
R 1
Figure 4. Arriving at the duopoly’s (Nash–Cournot) equilibrium in practice.






























Figure 4 illustrates how a Cournot-type equilibrium is reached in practice when
the reaction functions for OCR and AQA are out of equilibrium initially. Say that
OCR is initially operating a monopoly. It outputs (A c1)/2 awards. If AQA now
enters the market and assumes that OCR will maintain its initial output, it will out-
put at a level vertically above that point but on its own reaction line. However, this
point is off OCR’s reaction line; so in response, OCR will move its output level
horizontally onto its own one. This incremental process continues in a zigzag fash-
ion until an equilibrium is reached, coincident with the Nash equilibrium point, at
the intersection of the two reaction lines.
The Nash–Cournot equilibrium is not pareto-efﬁcient; if the two Awarding
Bodies could cooperate, they would both increase their proﬁt levels. Inside T,
both Awarding Bodies are better off (strict dominance); and on the boundary, one
Awarding Body is better off and the other no worse off (weak dominance).
Model 3. The awards market modelled as a duopoly where the strategic
variable is price
The strategic variable for Awarding Bodies in the two models described already is
level of production (R); but in this third and ﬁnal model (after Bertrand 1883), the
strategic variable is fee charged (P). The two Awarding Bodies simultaneously
decide on their pricing structures and market forces determine how many awards
are taken up from each. Stability is eventually reached, but this depends on whether
or not the awards sold by the competing Awarding Bodies are identical. Consider
ﬁrstly the case where the product lines are in distinguishable. If the products are
identical, schools will only buy from the Awarding Body that sells at the lower
price. Say for the purposes of this example that AQA initially offers lower prices
and makes higher-than-normal proﬁts. It gains a monopoly initially, although OCR
is eventually forced to challenge it by undercutting prices in an attempt to win mar-
ket share. If AQA offers lower prices and makes lower than normal proﬁts (or none
at all), then it must raise its prices to normal proﬁt levels or go out of business. In
either case, it is clear that charging different fees never results in a Nash equilib-
rium.
On the other hand, if Awarding Bodies charge the same fees and make higher- or
lower-than-normal proﬁts, then each has an incentive to deviate – one will undercut
the other to increase market share or will overcharge in an attempt to increase proﬁts
– so the only possible Nash equilibrium when Awarding Bodies are selling indistin-
guishable awards occurs when both charge the same fee and make ‘normal’ proﬁts.
This situation – two organisations in competition and making only normal proﬁts – is
a paradox, which can be overcome by having the two Awarding Bodies sell distin-
guishable products so that their interdependency is reduced. If OCR decides to sell at
a price P1 and AQA decides to sell at a price P2, schools will demand quantities:
R1 ¼ A P1 þ BP2
and































from each of the two Awarding Bodies, respectively, where B is a new constant that
reﬂects the extent to which OCR products are substitutes for AQA’s and vice versa.
These two equations – the demand functions for the two Awarding Bodies –
reveal that demand (Ri) for one Awarding Body’s product is positive even when it
charges an arbitrarily high price (Pi), provided the other Awarding Body also
charges a high price (Pj). This is a consequence of schools and colleges having to
buy awards from one or other Awarding Body every year. The market is a captive
one; schools are held to ransom despite the illusion of competition and this was a
concern for the UK Government at the time of the proposed 2012 reform (Gove
2012).
Using the same notation as in the previous models, the proﬁt functions are:
W1 ¼ P1R1  c1R1
W2 ¼ P2R2  c1R1
and substituting for R1 and R2 gives:
W1 ¼ AP1  P21 þ BP1P2  c1Aþ c1P1  c1BP2
W2 ¼ AP2  P22 þ BP1P2  c2Aþ c2P2  c2BP1








¼ A 2P2 þ BP1 þ c2
Equating to zero gives:
P1 ¼ ½Aþ BP2 þ c1=2
P2 ¼ ½Aþ BP1 þ c2=2
and since the second derivatives are negative (2), local maxima are indicated.
The method of simultaneous equations produces a Bertrand–Nash equilibrium
with solutions:
P1 ¼ AðBþ 2Þ þ 2c1 þ Bc14 B2






























P2 ¼ AðBþ 2Þ þ Bc1 þ 2c24 B2
And, if c1 = c2 (= c say), these reduce to:
P1 ¼ P2 ¼ ðAþ cÞ=ð2 BÞ
Since the price charged to customers cannot be negative, B< 2.
The situation is represented diagrammatically in Figure 5. The reaction curves
have positive gradients and strategically complement each other, unlike those for
the ﬁrst two models. To maximise their proﬁts and to arrive at the model’s
Bertrand–Nash equilibrium (marked BN on Figure 5), both Awarding Bodies must
be on their reaction function lines. As with the previous models, the equilibrium
point is not pareto-efﬁcient since both OCR and AQA could make higher proﬁts if
they set higher fees. This set of possibilities is shown marked T on Figure 5, but
since each Awarding Body has an incentive to deviate, it does not offer a more
likely or a more lasting solution than the Bertrand–Nash equilibrium.
Conclusion
This paper has presented three theoretical models to illustrate the essence of current
competition in the UK awards market and offers theoretical support for minister
Gove’s original (September 2012) proposed reform to establish a monopoly. The ﬁrst
describes how competition on the basis of output between three Awarding Bodies (as
now) can be represented. The second deals with the situation where the market is
reduced to two Awarding Bodies, a possibility not considered by the minister, as far as
we know, but an option nonetheless. The third describes how Awarding Bodies com-
A + c
2 - B 
(A + c ) / 2 
(B = 0) 
BN Bertrand - Nash equilibrium 




2 - B 
(A + c ) / 2 




(Assumes c1 = c2 = c)
































pete in terms of price and shows that one consequence of schools having to buy
awards at any price is that demand remains positive even when an arbitrarily high
price is charged.
Pareto-inefﬁciency is a feature of all three models: it is not the case that one
Awarding Body is necessarily made better off at the expense of the other(s). The mod-
elling also reveals that if Awarding Bodies could collude, they would increase their
proﬁts, but since this would require (at best) an agreement that would be difﬁcult to
enforce, or (at worst) an illegal cartel, it is not a practical solution to increasing the
funding that everyone agrees is sorely needed. Additionally, although the allegation is
occasionally made by schools and (anecdotally) by parents, the modelling suggests
that it is actually unlikely that collusion currently obtains in the market since such
arrangements are inherently so unstable. Only a Nash equilibrium offers stability, and
if Awarding Bodies are to compete on price rather than output, this only occurs when
the Awarding Bodies sell distinguishable products.
As currently constituted, the awards market is a false one and the annual recurring
shortcomings are a consequence of its inherent faults: the Awarding Bodies do not
operate at an equilibrium; they do not sell distinguishable awards; customers are
potentially held to ransom every year; there are too few competitors to ensure mean-
ingful competition8; and the organisations involved make insufﬁcient proﬁt to run the
system effectively. If funding the awards and assessment system adequately is the stra-
tegic priority, and it should be because Awarding Bodies must employ properly quali-
ﬁed examiners to deal with the millions of examination scripts produced every year,
then there is strong theoretical support for the minister’s original decision to monopo-
lise the market. Without reform, the market will continue to have all the disadvantages
of collusion without any of the beneﬁts of competition.
Notes
1. C.f. reports in the press; e.g. The Independent, February 7, 2013.
2. Apart from the three main ones (AQA, Edexcel and OCR), the other ﬁve are: CIE
(University of Cambridge International Examinations), which is traditionally an interna-
tional examination board, but now offers the Cambridge Pre-U as an alternative to A-lev-
els for state schools and is owned by Cambridge Assessment which also controls OCR;
CCEA (Council for the Curriculum, Examinations and Assessment), which is mostly
active in Northern Ireland; ICAAE (International Curriculum and Assessment Agency
Examinations), which is a very small specialised awarding body; the WJEC (Welsh Joint
Education Committee), which is owned by the Welsh local authorities; and the one exami-
nation board in Scotland, the SQA (Scottish Qualiﬁcations Authority). The JCQ (Joint
Council for Qualiﬁcations), established in January 2004, is their representative body.
3. The previous regulator was the Qualiﬁcations and Curriculum Authority (QCA), formed
on 1 October 1997 through a merger of the National Council for Vocational Qualiﬁcations
(NCVQ) and the School Curriculum and Assessment Authority (SCAA). In September
2007, the government announced that the regulatory functions of the QCA would move to
the new body, Ofqual. In April 2008, Ofqual began work as the independent regulator of
qualiﬁcations, examinations and assessments in England (and vocational qualiﬁcations in
Northern Ireland), accountable to Parliament rather than to government ministers.
The remaining work of the QCA was transferred to the Qualiﬁcations and Curriculum
Development Agency (QCDA) with effect from 1 April 2010. The QCDA in turn ceased
functioning in March 2012 when its examination administration work was taken over by
the Standards and Testing Agency (STA), the executive agency of the Department for
Education, and the Teaching Agency, which looks after National Curriculum assessment.
4. In 2002, there were 98 awarding bodies offering approved qualiﬁcations; the number
had risen to 144 by 2009.






























5. The main concern is that Awarding Bodies lower standards across their syllabuses
(speciﬁcations) in order to attract more schools (centres).
6. In other words, to one with a higher percentage of candidates achieving grade C and above.
7. It also assumes that a ﬁxed output is required collectively from the Awarding Bodies
every year.
8. This is in support of Wolf’s 2011 recommendation.
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